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A review of the past year's criminal cases reveals no remarkable
departures from prior Texas and federal law pertaining to con-
fessions, searches and seizures. Harmless error analysis is still
routinely applied, and both state and federal appellate courts give
credence to trial court fact-findings unless clearly erroneous.
I. CONFESSIONS
A. VOLUNTARINESS
"A confession is held voluntary if, under the totality of the circum-
stances, the statement is the product of the accused's free and rational
choice."' A review of a confession's voluntariness requires an appellate
court to give almost total deference to a trial court's determination of
* Brian Chandler is the Briefing Attorney for Judge Michael E. Keasler, Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals. He earned his J.D. cum laude from South Texas College of Law in
May 2004 where he served as Assistant Editor-in-Chief of the South Texas Law Review.
** Judge, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
1. United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461 (5th Cir. 2004).
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historical facts encompassing an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.2
However, de novo review is appropriate for mixed questions of law and
fact.3 In this past year, several cases continue to demonstrate the signifi-
cance of appellate court's deference to the trial court's determination of
facts.4
A promise made by law enforcement that induces a defendant to con-
fess to a crime may compromise the confession's voluntariness. How-
ever, an inducement sufficient to transform an otherwise voluntary
confession into an involuntary statement must be of "exceptional charac-
ter."'5 A confession will be considered involuntary if the promise was (1)
negative, (2) made or sanctioned by someone in authority, and (3) of such
an influential nature that it would cause a defendant to speak untruth-
fully.6 Whether the defendant in fact spoke untruthfully is irrelevant to a
proper analysis.7
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston held that a law enforce-
ment officer's statement "could help yourself" was insufficient to render
the appellant's statement involuntary.8 The court reasoned this non-spe-
cific statement lacked the character necessary to induce the appellant to
confess falsely.9 In another unlawful inducement case, this same court
held that an appellant's wish to save his relatives from prosecution did
not make his confession involuntary. 10 In the absence of a threat, an ac-
cused's subjective belief that cooperation will relieve a relative from pros-
ecution will not deem his confession inadmissible.1 '
Police conduct may bring forth "a declaration naturally born of re-
morse, or relief, or desperation" without producing an involuntary con-
fession.12 Pointing to his severely depressed and suicidal condition, the
appellant in Jaggers v. State contended his audio-taped statement was not
a product of his free will and rational interest. The First Court of Ap-
peals in Houston disagreed. It held that the evidence before the trial
court supported a finding that the confession was a result of a remorseful
state of mind, not an overborne will.13
2. Colgin v. State, 132 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet.
ref'd).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., May v. State, 139 S.W.3d 93, 100-01 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet.
ref'd); Colgin, 132" S.W.3d at 530-31; Hunter v. State, 148 S.W.3d 526, 530 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd).
5. Drake v. State, 123 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
ref'd).
6. Martinez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
7. Id. at 795.
8. Drake, 123 S.W.3d at 603.
9. Id.
10. Hunter, 148 S.W.3d at 532.
11. Id.
12. Jaggers v. State, 125 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet.
ref'd) (quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)).
13. Id.
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In a similar case, the Fifth Circuit rejected a claim of involuntariness
based on the accused having taken methamphetamine and not having
slept for three days before giving a statement. 14 The Fifth Circuit held
the government's evidence satisfied its burden in showing that the confes-
sion was made knowingly and voluntarily by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 15 In reaching this conclusion, the court highlighted the accused's
responses to law enforcements' questions, demeanor, and willingness to
talk to the case agents. 16
B. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
When subjected to custodial interrogation, an accused is vested with
Miranda's protections that require the accused be adequately and effec-
tively apprised of his rights. Failure to give these mandated rights usually
requires exclusion of any statements given to law enforcement. "A per-
son is in custody only if, under all the circumstances, a reasonable, inno-
cent person would believe that the person's freedom of movement was
restrained to the degree associated with an arrest. ' 17 The United States
Supreme Court reminded us in Yarborough v. Alvarado that the Miranda
custody test is an objective one and is distinguishable from a subjective
analysis undertaken in determining a confession's voluntariness.' 8 Re-
versing the Ninth Circuit, the Court held that it was proper for a state
court to refuse to consider an accused's age or prior history with law en-
forcement in deciding whether the accused was in custody. 19
Merely being questioned at the police station does not necessarily
mean that one is being subjected to custodial interrogation. Evidence
that an accused went voluntarily to the police station and was free to
leave after two separate interviews was held not to be custodial interroga-
tion in spite of testimony describing interrogator's shouting, accusations,
and touching of accused's hand. 20 DWI investigations that include ques-
tioning the driver and administering field-sobriety tests generally do not
qualify as custodial interrogations. The First Court of Appeals in Hous-
ton held accordingly in McRae v. State.21 There, the court concluded that
appellant's statement admitting he consumed alcohol was admissible de-
spite not being given his Miranda warning because there was no evidence
in the record that indicated the officer manifested an intent to arrest the
appellant before the statement was given. 22
14. United States v. Reynolds, 367 F.3d 294, 297-99 (5th Cir. 2004).
15. Id. at 299.
16. Id.
17. May, 139 S.W.3d at 100.
18. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2151 (2004).
19. Id. at 2151-52.
20. May, 139 S.W.3d at 100.
21. McRae v. State, 152 S.W.3d 739, 748-49 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no
pet.).
22. Id. at 749.
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To qualify as custodial interrogation, the statements must be the result
of interrogation by law enforcement personnel or their agents. Inculpa-
tory statements made to hospital personnel were held not to be interroga-
tion.23 Additionally, statements made to the news media did not satisfy
the requirements for custodial interrogation.2 4 Finding no offer by law
enforcement to the news reporter to act as an agent (nor acceptance by
the reporter), the Court of Criminal Appeals found this case dissimilar to
those "where the police employ an informant to deliberately elicit incrim-
inating statements. 25
The Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have
interpreted Miranda as requiring its warnings to be given before interro-
gation begins.2 6 Both courts expressly disavowed the police practice of
questioning an accused before giving Miranda warnings. The practice of
obtaining a confession, reading the accused his Miranda warnings, and
then having the accused restate the already-covered ground was held to
undermine Miranda's intention of reducing the risk of an admitted co-
erced confession. 27 The Supreme Court further stated that the insertion
of Miranda warnings in the middle of interrogation "deprive[s] a defen-
dant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his
rights and the consequences of abandoning them."'2 8
An accused must affirmatively invoke his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel to enjoy its protections. This invocation must be made in regard
to a specific crime.29 In Jaggers v. State, the First Court of Appeals held
that while appellant did request a lawyer at the interview, the request was
insufficient to identify the specific crime to which appellant was attempt-
ing to relate his right to counsel.30 Because the appellant potentially had
information concerning multiple crimes, the officers could not have
known whether appellant was invoking his right to the theft allegation or
the pending murder investigation. This ambiguous invocation permitted
the officer to inquire further whether the appellant wished to talk to
him.31 The court concluded that the statement was admissible because
after appellant confirmed his desire to talk to the officer, the appellant
waived his Miranda rights after they were read.32
When an accused properly requests counsel, all interrogation must
cease "until counsel is provided or until the accused reinitiates conversa-
tion."'33 Any statements secured after this invocation are admissible only
23. Escamilla v. State, 143 S.W.3d 814, 824-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
24. Id. at 824.
25. Id.
26. Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2610-11 (2004); Jones v. State, 119 S.W.3d 766,
775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
27. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2613; Jones, 119 S.W.3d at 775.
28. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2611.




33. Hunter, 148 S.W.3d at 529.
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if a court finds (1) the accused manifested an intention to re-commence
the discussion and (2) he knowingly and intelligently waived the rights
previously invoked.34 Whether the accused initiates discussion with law
enforcement is reviewed on a case-by-case basis. Granting deference to
the trial court's factual findings, a question by the accused concerning the
range of punishment was held to be a sufficient re-initiation.35
C. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Miranda warnings are statutorily embodied in Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure article 38.22, section 2. Article 38.22 provides that a statement
resulting from custodial interrogation is inadmissible, unless the face of
the statement provides that the accused has received adequate warnings
and has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. 36
These warnings must include:
(1) the right to remain silent and any statement may be used at trial;
(2) any statement may be used as evidence in court;
(3) the right to have a lawyer present during questioning;
(4) the right to an appointed lawyer to advise him during questioning if
he is unable to employ one; and
(5) the right to terminate the interview at any time.37
The State's failure to administer article 38.22 warnings is reversible er-
ror. But substantial compliance with the articles mandatory requirements
will be sufficient. In Rutherford v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals
addressed the sufficiency of a pre-printed warning form containing dupli-
cate article 38.22(a)(4) warnings-right to appointed lawyer for question-
ing-without an (a)(3) warning stating an express right to have counsel
present during questioning.38 The court held the warning sufficient. Find-
ing substantial compliance, the court reasoned that the (a)(3) and (a)(4)
warnings were identical in substantial part; specifically that "he has the
right to have a lawyer . . . to advise him prior to and during any
questioning. ,39
Article 38.22, section 6 requires a trial court to make written fact find-
ings and conclusions of law when the voluntariness of a statement is chal-
lenged.40 Section 6's efficacy does not turn on whether a defendant
objects to the absence of these filings.41 When a trial court fails to com-
ply with section 6, proper procedure requires a court of appeals to direct
the trial court to make written findings of fact and conclusions of law.42
34. Id.
35. Id. at 530.
36. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
37. Id. art. 38.22, § 2(a).
38. Rutherford v. State, 129 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
39. Id. at 226.
40. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 6 (Vernon 2004).




Texas courts continue to require a causal connection between a statu-
tory violation and the resulting confession. In Sierra v. State, the appellant
claimed law enforcement violated Code of Criminal Procedure article
15.16, which states that the person executing an arrest warrant shall, with-
out unnecessary delay, take the arrested person before the magistrate.
43
Sierra further asserted the statutory violation required his subsequent
confession to be suppressed by way of Texas's statutory exclusionary rule
article 38.23.44 In light of evidence that Sierra acknowledged and waived
his Miranda rights, the court found any delay in bringing Sierra before a
magistrate had no causal connection to his statement.
45
D. JUVENILES
Texas courts continue to look very closely at juvenile confessions and
insist that they be obtained in strict adherence to the relevant Family
Code provisions. Under the Family Code, police must promptly notify
the child's parent, guardian, or custodian that the child is in custody and
explain why the child is being held.46 In Marsh v. State, the Fourteenth
Court of Appeals held that police complied with the Code's parental-
notification provision even though the informing officer gave the juve-
nile's parents incorrect information on where the juvenile was being
held.47 Absent any evidence of attempts to intentionally mislead, there is
no violation found in providing incorrect information that exceeds the
Code's requirements. 48
Like statutory violations involving adults, a violation of this Code sec-
tion will not render a confession inadmissible unless there is a causal con-
nection between the violation and the juvenile's confession. The juvenile
carries both the burden of producing evidence of the parental-notification
violation and a causal connection between the violation and the resulting
confession.49 Mere speculation that a juvenile's parents might have ar-
ranged counsel for him, intervened in the interrogation, or advised the
juvenile not to make a statement is insufficient to meet the burden re-
quired to show a causal connection. 50
When a juvenile is taken into custody, police must immediately bring
the child to a designated juvenile processing office or to an alternative
site provided under the Family Code.51 A violation was found when of-
ficers took a juvenile into custody and placed him in an area with adult
43. Sierra v. State, 157 S.W.3d 52, 58 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. filed).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 52.02(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
47. Marsh v. State, 140 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet.
ref'd).
48. See id.
49. Pham v. State, 125 S.W.3d 622, 627-28 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet.
granted); Gonzales v. State, 125 S.W.3d 616, 618 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet.
granted).
50. Pham, 125 S.W.3d at 628-29.
51. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 52.02 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
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offenders even though the police station had a designated juvenile
processing office. 52 Because the arrested child was not taken to a juve-
nile processing office or a statutory alternative, the statement obtained by
the investigating officer was inadmissible at trial.53
II. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
A. IN GENERAL
Texas state courts continue to follow the United States Supreme
Court's lead in search-and-seizure cases. Cases are almost always ana-
lyzed in light of the Fourth Amendment, rather than under the Texas
Constitution. In reviewing a motion to suppress ruling, both state and
federal courts give great deference to the trial court's determination of
historical facts while reviewing questions of law de novo.54
An accused only has standing to contest a search if the accused had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in a place government officials or agents
invaded. To demonstrate standing, a defendant must show that (1) by his
conduct, he exhibited an actual, subjective expectation of privacy, and (2)
society is prepared to recognize his subjective expectation of privacy as
objectively reasonable.55 In evaluating whether an individual's subjective
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively rea-
sonable, courts weigh the following factors:
" Whether the accused had a property or possessory interest in the
place invaded;
" Whether he was legitimately in the place invaded;
" Whether he had complete dominion or control and the right to ex-
clude others;
" Whether normal, customary precautions were taken to secure
privacy;
* Whether the place was put to some private use; and
* Whether the privacy claim is consistent with historical notions of
privacy. 56
Weighing these factors, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals found no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in a work computer used by a teacher in a
school classroom. 57 Courts also look to relevant legislation to evaluate
whether a subjective expectation of privacy is reasonable. 58 In a case in-
volving a Transportation Safety Administration search of a passenger's
52. In re U.G., 128 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 382 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2004); Stone v. State,
147 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. ref'd).
55. Turner v. State, 132 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet.
ref'd).
56. Voyles v. State, 133 S.W.3d 303, 305-06 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
57. Id. at 306.
58. See generally Turner, 132 S.W.3d at 507 (referencing the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals's examination of municipal code provisions to examine expectation of privacy in




pocket at the airport, the First Court of Appeals referenced a federal
statute mandating the screening of all passengers and their luggage
before boarding to determine reasonableness.5 9 The court held the ac-
cused's harbored subjective expectation that he will not be stopped or
searched at the gate is one society does not recognize as reasonable.
60
Courts have undoubtedly found an expectation of privacy in one's
home. And this expectation unequivocally encompasses the house's cur-
tilage or area surrounding the house where the activity of home life ex-
tends. However, the restriction against intruding upon one's curtilage is
not without limits. An officer can enter a house's curtilage in order to
contact its occupants. In fulfilling this purpose, the officer may also open
fence gates within the curtilage so long as the occupant does not manifest
intent to restrict access or the officer does not stray from the normal path
of traffic. 61 A court of appeals held that the operation of a business re-
pairing other people's cars, the unlocked fence, the presence of a well-
defined dirt driveway, and the inference that customers used the drive-
way were sufficient indicia that the appellant did not have an expectation
of privacy in a dirt road on his property.
62
The Fifth Circuit recognized that a person can have a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in someone else's property. However, in United States v.
Phillips, it found the evidence insufficient to warrant such a finding.
63
Analogizing to the Supreme Court's decision in Carter,64 the court held
the use of another's storage shed to store cocaine was solely for a com-
mercial purpose-the storage and later distribution of cocaine-and
therefore there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.65 The court
also held that unlike the "overnight guest" cases, 66 Phillips was not given
express permission to use the shed, and therefore his presence was
wrongful. 67
An individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned
or disclaimed property. Whether property has been abandoned or dis-
claimed may be inferred from an individual's words, acts, or other facts.
68
When an accused denies ownership of property when asked by law en-
forcement, it is sufficient to support a finding that the accused abandoned
or disclaimed the property, thereby denying the accused standing to con-
test the seizure.69
59. Turner, 132 S.W.3d at 507.
60. Id.
61. Buchanan v. State, 129 S.W.3d 767, 773 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. ref'd).
62. Id. at 774.
63. Phillips, 382 F.3d at 495-97.
64. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 91 (1998).
65. Phillips, 382 F.3d at 496.
66. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 (1990) (finding overnight guests may have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their host's home).
67. Phillips, 382 F.3d at 497.
68. Dominguez v. State, 125 S.W.3d 755, 762 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003,
pet. ref'd).
69. Id. at 763.
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B. ARREST, STOP, OR INQUIRY WITHOUT WARRANT
There are three distinct types of police-citizen interactions, each requir-
ing different levels of constitutional protection:
1. encounters, which require no objective justification;
2. investigative detentions, which require reasonable suspicion; and
3. arrests, which require probable cause.70
1. Encounters
Unlike nonconsensual encounters, no level of probable cause or rea-
sonable suspicion is required for an officer to approach an individual to
ask questions or to request a search. A consensual encounter does not
trigger any constitutional protections. 7' An encounter is consensual if a
person under the circumstances would feel free to disregard the officer or
terminate the encounter. 72
Last term, the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Lidster approved the use of
roadblocks in effecting brief information-seeking highway stops absent
reasonable suspicion.73 In response to a fatal hit-and-run that occurred
earlier in the week, police set up a highway checkpoint to gather any
information drivers may have had about the fatal incident.74 Each driver
was stopped for approximately ten to fifteen seconds, was asked if they
had seen anything happen last weekend, and was given a flyer requesting
any information on the incident. While approaching the checkpoint, Lid-
ster swerved and almost hit an officer. After concluding Lidster was in-
toxicated, officers arrested him for driving under the influence.
Distinguishing this case from Indianapolis v. Edmond,75 the Lidster Court
highlighted the roadblock's purpose of information gathering, rather than
functioning as a general crime control apparatus. 76 Law enforcement's
interest in investigating a crime resulting in human death outweighed the
brief delay imposed by the roadblock.77
In United States v. Williams, plain-clothed officers approached Williams
after their drug-sniffing dog alerted them to a bag located on a Grey-
hound bus. 78 After agreeing to speak with the officers, Williams was
asked to accompany the officers to a separate baggage handling area to
avoid the noise of the departing buses.79 He complied with the request.
Finding no coercive or restrictive circumstances, the Fifth Circuit held
that the encounter was consensual and that the encounter's consensual
70. United States v. Williams, 365 F.3d 399, 403-04 (5th Cir. 2004).
71. Id. at 404.
72. Id.
73. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427-28 (2004).
74. Id. at 422.
75. 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000) (holding the roadblock's purpose was designed primarily for
crime control and therefore the traffic stops must be based on reasonable suspicion).
76. Lidster, 540 U.S. at 423-26.
77. Id. at 427-28.
78. Williams, 365 F.3d at 401-02.
79. Id. at 404-05.
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nature did not end when the officer requested to speak with him in a
different part of the bus station.80
When an individual is not free to leave or an officer conveys a message
that compliance with the requests is required, the encounter may cross
the threshold into the realm of a seizure contemplated by Terry. The
Austin Court of Appeals so held in Hayes v. State.81 While the encounter
was initially consensual, the court held that Hayes was "seized" for
Fourth Amendment purposes when the officers took Hayes's identifica-
tion back to the patrol car to run a warrant check.82 Upon finding an
individual seized, courts analyze the seizure under the rubric of Terry and
its progeny.
2. Investigative Detentions (Terry Stops)
A person seizes another when he, "by means of physical force or show
of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen."'83 The
Fifth Circuit found that an officer's intentional shooting at an individual's
car with the intent to terminate the person's freedom of movement is a
seizure by physical force.84 Police may stop and briefly detain an individ-
ual suspected of criminal activity on less than probable cause. To effect a
valid Terry stop, an officer must have reasonable suspicion based on spe-
cific articulable facts that, in light of the officer's experience and general
knowledge, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude the detained
person is involved in criminal activity.85 Police-investigative detentions
are reviewed in two parts. Courts examine whether the officer's action
was justified at its inception and then resolve whether the subsequent
actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying
the stop.86 The reasonableness of the stop is evaluated based on the to-
tality of the circumstances. 87
Traffic stops are Fourth Amendment seizures resembling investigative
detentions and are analyzed under Terry.88 While the typical case usually
involves an officer's observations, reasonable suspicion may be based on
other reliable sources. In Harrison v. State, a police officer stopped Har-
rison after a concerned citizen called 911 to report Harrison's erratic driv-
ing and suspicion of drunk driving.89 Rejecting Harrison's argument of
insufficient suspicion supporting the stop, the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals held the tip bore sufficient indicia of reliability.90 The court's hold-
80. Id.
81. 132 S.W.3d 147, 152-53 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
82. Id. at 153.
83. Flores v. City of Palacios, 381 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)).
84. Id.
85. Harrison v. State, 144 S.W.3d 82, 86 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. granted).
86. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004).
87. Joubert v. State, 129 S.W.3d 686, 688 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet.).
88. State v. Gray, 157 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2004, pet. granted).
89. Harrison, 144 S.W.3d at 84.
90. Id. at 86.
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ing noted the caller's personal observation of the potential crime in
progress and that the caller was neither connected with police nor solic-
ited for information. 9
1
However, when an officer detains an individual based on information
provided by another officer, a court undertakes a slightly different analy-
sis. First, a court determines whether the officer making the stop reason-
ably relied on the information. 92 Second, if the court finds reasonable
reliance, then a court looks at whether the officer providing the informa-
tion had sufficient suspicion to ask for the stop or arrest.93 An officer's
reliance on another officer's account that an individual was associated
with two girls recently arrested was a mere suspicious association and,
without more, did not constitute an objectively reasonable basis to detain
an individual.94 The El Paso Court of Appeals similarly held that infor-
mation provided by another officer did not amount to reasonable suspi-
cion.95 An officer initiated a traffic stop on the instructions of two
undercover narcotics officers conducting surveillance of a particular resi-
dence. Suppression hearing testimony indicated the only information the
two other officers relayed to the detaining officer was that the car had
pulled up to the surveilled residence, stayed a short time, and then left.
96
Because the officer "did not provide any information about the surround-
ing circumstances, such as the time of day, whether the officers had rea-
son to suspect that there were drugs at the residence, ... whether the area
was known for drug activity," or information concerning his or the other
officer's experience and training, the court held the State did not prove
that the officers had sufficient reasonable suspicion to execute the traffic
stop. 9
7
The next step in determining a stop's reasonableness is whether the
stop was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the
interference. As a general rule, an investigative stop can last no longer
than necessary to effect the purpose of the stop. A continued detention is
justified if, during the valid investigative detention, an officer develops
reasonable suspicion that the detainee is connected to criminal activity. 98
Courts have routinely permitted law enforcement questioning on the pur-
pose and itinerary of a driver's trip and requesting a driver's license and
vehicle registration during a traffic stop.99 Police questioning on a subject
apart from the purpose of the stop is not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.100 The Fifth Circuit found a continued detention was justi-
fied based on the officer ascertaining that the appellant was not the
91. Id. at 86-87.
92. Hayes v. State, 132 S.W.3d 147, 154 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Young v. State, 133 S.W.3d 839, 843-44 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.).
96. Id. at 843.
97. Id.
98. State v. Gray, 157 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2004, pet. granted).
99. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 507-08 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
100. Id. at 508.
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owner or lessee of the car, the actual lessee was not present, and the
appellant's and passenger's stories conflicted.10' The Court of Criminal
Appeals encountered a similar case last year raising the issue of a traffic
stop's proper scope.
In Kothe v. State, an officer received a radio dispatch about a poten-
tially intoxicated driver with the description of the suspected car.'02
Matching Kothe's car to the broadcasted description, the officer pulled in
behind Kothe's parked car at a rest station. After concluding Kothe was
not intoxicated, the officer returned to his patrol car to perform a com-
puterized warrant check. The check showed no outstanding warrants. As
the officer was about to release Kothe, the officer received notice that
Kothe might be in possession of a bag of coins taken from a household
safe. Obtaining Kothe's consent to search, the officer found drug para-
phernalia in the car. After the officer discovered the paraphernalia, the
passenger admitted to possessing heroin, which Kothe asked her to hold.
The Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the officer's decision to wait
for the results of the warrant check before releasing Kothe was reasona-
ble. 10 3 The court noted that the officer received the coin information and
the warrant-check results nearly simultaneously. The duration of the stop
did not exceed the bounds of the detention. 10 4 In Wolf v. State, however,
the Waco Court of Appeals held a three minute period of time was a
prolonged detention not supported by reasonable suspicion. 10 5 The of-
ficer in Wolf detained the appellant to issue him a warning on a defective
tag light. The officer detained the car's occupants for three minutes after
discovering criminal histories were unavailable. The detention was
longer than necessary in effecting the purpose of the stop.106 Because
nervousness and being overly cooperative were insufficient to warrant a
man of reasonable caution to believe prolonging the detention was ap-
propriate, the officer violated appellant's Fourth Amendment rights.10 7
Interpreting Court of Criminal Appeals case law, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals curiously announced that "an officer may not, within the
scope of a valid traffic stop, request identification and check for outstand-
ing warrants of passengers. 10 8 The court further added, "[i]n order to
conduct such an investigation of the passenger, the officer must have sep-
arate reasonable suspicion of the passenger." 109 Finding the detention of
the passenger unreasonable, the court held that there was no evidence
that established reasonable suspicion supporting the officer's questioning
101. Id.
102. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
103. Id. at 66-67.
104. Id.
105. Wolf v. State, 137 S.W.3d 797, 804-45 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet.).
106. Id. at 804.
107. Id. at 804-05.
108. St. George v. State, Nos. 2-03-421-CR, 2-03-422-CR, 2004 WL 1944779, at *2-5
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth Aug. 31, 2004, no pet.).
109. Id. at *5.
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of the car's passenger at its inception. 110
3. Warrantless Arrests and Searches
Once a person is lawfully detained, an officer may frisk the detainee
when he reasonably suspects that the detainee is armed. A pat-down is
justified if a reasonably prudent officer would be warranted in believing
his or another's safety is in danger. While the focus of a pat-down is
safety and the search for weapons, an officer may seize items immediately
recognizable as contraband discovered during the frisk for weapons. In
confronting an individual loitering in a known drug-trafficking area for a
substantial period of time, police officers were justified in conducting a
pat-down for weapons.11 1 Further, the officer was entitled to seize a bag-
gie protruding from the appellant's open pocket when the officer readily
identified it as a type of baggie used to carry drugs.112 However, courts
still maintain "[a]n individual's presence in an area of expected criminal
activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particular-




Courts apply a similar analysis when evaluating whether law enforce-
ment is justified in conducting a protective sweep of a residence upon
lawful entry. Like the Terry analysis for pat-downs, whether an officer
can perform a quick and limited search of the premise turns on whether
an officer reasonably believes that an area to be swept harbors an individ-
ual posing a danger to those present at the scene. Expanding on the Su-
preme Court's opinion in Maryland v. Buie1 4 allowing protective sweeps
when performing an in-house arrest, the Fifth Circuit held that an in-
home arrest is not a required element of an in-home protective sweep.
115
While an arrest tends to show the potential risk of the officer's safety,
other circumstances may establish that danger as well. 116 A protective
sweep is not a full search. It must be limited to a cursory inspection of
those spaces where a person may be found. The Eastland Court of Ap-
peals held that officers exceeded the scope of a protective sweep when
they lifted up the mattress to look for possible weapons." 7 The court
reasoned that the officers did not and could not reasonably believe that a
person was concealed between the mattress and the box spring. 1 8
110. Id. at *6.
111. Wilson v. State, 132 S.W.3d 695, 699-700 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, pet ref'd).
112. Id. at 700.
113. See Gregory v. State, No. 01-03-00192-CR, 2004 WL 2415112, at *2 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. filed) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24
(2000)).
114. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
115. United States v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct.
437, 160 L. Ed. 2d 317 (2004).
116. Id.





Police must have probable cause that a search of a residence would
produce evidence of a crime. But exigent circumstances must exist to
justify a warrantless entry into a home. The following factors in evaluat-
ing the existence of exigent circumstances are well recognized:
* The urgency and the time required to secure a warrant;
* The reasonable belief that seizable items were subject to destruc-
tion or removal;
* The danger to officers while attempting to obtain a warrant;
* The suspect's awareness of police presence; and
' The destructibility of the contraband. 119
In Parker v. State, officers approached a residence to investigate a report
that minors were drinking.' 20 When they approached, the officers heard
someone in the house announce their presence, observed a person run-
ning upstairs, and when the door was opened, they smelled burnt mari-
juana. After finding these observations constituted probable cause, the
court found exigent circumstances existed to justify entry into the resi-
dence because obtaining a warrant would have taken approximately an
hour and the officer's believed the house needed to be secured to prevent
evidence destruction.121 The court concluded that the entry was lawful to
secure the house pending application for a search warrant. 122 Courts
have also analyzed the taking of blood samples under exigent circum-
stances. In an intoxicated assault case, the Texarkana Court of Appeals
held that exigent circumstances existed "in cases such as these because
alcohol in the blood is quickly consumed and the evidence may be lost
forever." 123
The emergency doctrine permits an officer to make a warrantless entry
when he reasonably believes that a person needs immediate aid. In Rau-
scher v. State, the First Court of Appeals in Houston held the circum-
stances known to the officer justified his entry into an apartment based
on this exception.' 24 Responding to a "check on welfare" call placed by
an apartment complex employee, the officer was told that repeated at-
tempts to contact the resident had failed, the lock on the door had been
changed without notice, the residents had been heard arguing some time
earlier, and that a foul odor was emanating from the unit.1 25 While the
officer was incorrect in concluding that the smell was a decomposing
body, he was nonetheless justified in entering the apartment without a
warrant.
1 26
119. Parker v. State, No. 07-02-0354-CR, 2005 WL 66942, at *3 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
Jan. 12, 2004, pet. filed).
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id. at *3.
122. Id.
123. Blumensetter v. State, 135 S.W.3d 234, 243 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.).
124. Rauscher v. State, 129 S.W.3d 714, 722-23 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004,
pet. ref'd).
125. Id. at 722.
126. Id. at 723.
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A peace officer may arrest an individual without a warrant for any of-
fense committed in the officer's presence or view. The officer need not
determine whether an offense was in fact committed to justify a warrant-
less arrest. But probable cause is the touchstone. In Moreno v. State,
failure to present the officer with a valid, unexpired driver's license and
proof of insurance was held to sufficiently establish probable cause for a
violation of the Transportation Code.127 The State was not required to
prove that Moreno's license had actually expired or that he had no
insurance. 128
In Maryland v. Pringle, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the degree to which probable cause must be particularized to an individ-
ual. 129 A police officer stopped a speeding car carrying three occupants:
the driver, Pringle (the front-seat passenger), and a back-seat passen-
ger.130 The driver consented to a search of the vehicle. The officer found
$763 of rolled-up cash in the glove box and five plastic baggies of cocaine
from behind the rear-seat armrest. When the officer began the search,
the armrest was in an upright position laying flat against the rear seats.
All three occupants were questioned about ownership of the drugs and
money.13 1 They were told if no one claimed ownership of the drugs, they
were all going to be arrested. All three were arrested when no one pro-
vided any information.
Because the cash was directly in front of Pringle and the baggies of
cocaine were accessible to all of the passengers, the Court held there was
a reasonable inference that all the men in the car had knowledge of, and
exercised dominion and control over, the drugs.132 The Court distin-
guished this case from Ybarra v. Illinois by stating that the occupants of
the car were in a relatively small automobile and not located in a public
tavern like the appellant in Ybarra.133 The Court again noted that a car
passenger "will often be engaged in a common enterprise with the driver,
and have the same interest in concealing the fruits or the evidence of
their wrongdoing. '134
Under a lawful arrest, a person's privacy interest yields, allowing the
police to search for weapons, means of escape, and evidence without any
requisite level of suspicion.135 A search incident to an arrest extends only
to a search of the person and the area within his immediate control. In
Mondragon-Garcia, the appellant was apprehended outside of a motel
127. Moreno v. State, 124 S.W.3d 339, 349 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
128. Id.
129. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370-74 (2003).
130. Id. at 367-68.
131. Id. at 368-69.
132. Id. at 371-72.
133. Id. at 373 (referencing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979), which held that a
person's mere propinquity to other suspected individuals does not alone give rise to proba-
ble cause to search that person).
134. Id. (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1999)).




room after fleeing from the police.136 Although the record was unclear
whether the appellant actually physically re-entered the room, the court
rejected the incident-to-an-arrest justification for the search of the motel
room. The court noted the proximity component of a search incident to
arrest and held that the seized gun was not in appellant's immediate con-
trol.137 When an arrest involves a recent occupant of a vehicle, the police
may search the passenger compartment of that vehicle as incident to the
arrest. But the search must occur contemporaneously with the arrest.138
Fruits of a search occurring significantly after the arrest are
inadmissible. 139
When executing a search warrant, an officer may detain persons who
are present at the scene. This narrow exception to the probable cause
requirement does not automatically extend to persons merely on the
premises at the time of the execution of the search warrant. 140 Other
independent factors must exist linking the person to the unlawful activi-
ties on the premises. The Supreme Court has cited several justifications
for the detaining individuals at the scene: "(1) preventing flight in the
event incriminating evidence is found; (2) minimizing the risk of harm to
the officers; and (3) conducting the search in an orderly fashion.' 141 The
detention of a person discovered taking inventory in the business where
police were executing a narcotics search warrant was held to be permissi-
ble. 142 The act of taking inventory was sufficient evidence that he was not
"merely present" at the scene. Also, the search for narcotics implicitly
carried with it the potential for sudden violence or frantic efforts to con-
ceal or destroy evidence. 143 But without probable cause, police are not
permitted to conduct strip searches of individuals located at the scene. 144
Provided there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed
and that contraband is located in a vehicle, police may search every part
of a vehicle and any container that may contain the object of the search.
In applying this automobile exception to the warrant requirement, Texas
courts continue to recognize that procurement of a warrant may become
impracticable "because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the local-
ity or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."'1 45 And like all
probable cause determinations, courts look to the totality of the
circumstances.
136. Mondragon-Garcia v. State, 129 S.W.3d 674, 677-78 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004,
pet. ref'd).
137. Id. at 678.
138. Strong v. State, 138 S.W.3d 546, 555 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.).
139. Id.
140. Morrison v. State, 132 S.W.3d 37, 43 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet.
ref'd).
141. Id. at 44 (referencing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702-03 (1981)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1003-05 (5th Cir. 2003).
145. See Blaylock v. State, 125 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. ref'd)
(citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1970)); see also Conde v. State, 135
S.W.3d 252, 255 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet.).
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After executing a lawful arrest, an officer may perform a suspicionless
search of a person's belongings-including a vehicle-for purposes of
making an inventory.146 A valid inventory search must be conducted in
accordance with a standardized criteria or established routine designed to
produce an inventory. It cannot "serve as a ruse for a general rummaging
in order to discover incriminating evidence. ' 147 Despite finding no lan-
guage in the department policy specifically addressing whether officers
are authorized to search locked trunks or closed containers, a court of
appeals held that officers' training on how to inventory containers
demonstrated an established routine. 148 The court held the search of a
closed backpack found in the trunk of appellant's car was a valid inven-
tory search. 149
In two cases decided within a few weeks of each other, the First Court
of Appeals in Houston held that "'in the context of inventories,' Article
I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution does not provide greater protection
to individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth
Amendment. '150 The court declined to follow the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals's three-judge plurality opinion in Autran v. State which expressed a
refusal to presume a search reasonable under the Texas Constitution
merely because departmental policies were followed. 151 In so holding,
the court of appeals noted other courts' failure to follow Autran and the
subsequent Court of Criminal Appeals cases' inconsistency with Autran's
pronouncement. 152
C. AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT OF SEARCH WARRANTS
An affidavit must contain sufficient facts allowing a court to conclude
that the object of the search would probably be located on the prem-
ises. 153 Appellate courts review the sufficiency of an affidavit on its four
corners and any proper inferences that may be drawn from its facts under
the totality of the circumstances. 154 Reviewing courts grant significant
deference to a magistrate's findings of probable cause in an affidavit. 155
This past year brought review of affidavits using confidential infor-
mants' information in obtaining search warrants. Applying the rule in
Illinois v. Gates,156 Texas courts reiterate that while an informant's verac-
146. See Ray v. State, 148 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. granted).
147. Richards v. State, 150 S.W.3d 762, 771 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet.
ref'd) (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Garza v. State, 137 S.W.3d 878, 885 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2004, pet.
ref'd); Rothenberg v. State, No. 01-03-00364-CR, 2004 WL 1277542, at *4 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] June 10, 2004, pet. ref'd).
151. Garza, 137 S.W.3d at 885 (referencing Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1994)).
152. Rothenberg, 2004 WL 1277542, at *4-5.
153. Davis v. State, 144 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd).
154. Hankins v. State, 132 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
155. State v. Gonzales, 146 S.W.3d 760, 762 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. ref'd).
156. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
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ity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are not requirements for a valid
affidavit, these elements are highly relevant in determining the value of
the information provided by an informant.1 57 In Cardona v. State, the
affidavit stated that a confidential informant provided information to the
affiant officer that he personally observed various items in a place of bus-
iness and that the occupants were "going to cook" methamphetamine on
a certain day.1 58 The Amarillo Court of Appeals held the affidavit insuf-
ficient to establish probable cause. The court found that the affidavit,
among other things, failed to address the basis of informant's knowledge
that occupants were "going to cook," the informant's reliability, or
whether the items informant saw were connected to the manufacture of
drugs. a59
The courts of appeals remain uncertain whether an omission from an
affidavit should receive a Franks 60 analysis like that given to an affida-
vit's false statement. 16' But a review of previous cases indicates that they
often do. 162 In Franks, the Supreme Court stated that if a defendant
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the affidavit includes a
false statement that the affiant placed in the affidavit intentionally, know-
ingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, and the statement was nec-
essary in finding probable cause, then the search warrant is invalid.' 63 In
State v. Gonzales, law enforcement orchestrated a "controlled delivery"
of a package it knew contained marijuana to its intended recipient. 164
When attempting to make the delivery, the postal inspector was greeted
by a twelve-year-old child. The child repeatedly told the inspector that
Beto Pena, the intended recipient, did not live at the residence despite
the package's labeling. 165 The inspector left the package in the child's
hands. The search warrant's accompanying affidavit stated that "one
Beto Pena and person or persons unknown by name or description who
received the controlled delivery ... did then and there unlawfully pos-
sess ... a controlled substance, to wit: Marihuana.' 'a66 Finding no deliv-
ery to any suspected parties as stated in the affidavit, the court excised
this statement from the affidavit and held the corrected affidavit did not
establish probable cause.
Apart from a warrant's supporting affidavit, the search warrant itself
must adequately describe the place to be searched and objects to be
seized. The United States Supreme Court reviewed the requirements and
157. State v. Walker, 140 S.W.3d 761, 766 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no
pet.).
158. Cardona v. State, 134 S.W.3d 854, 856 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. ref'd).
159. Id. at 857-58.
160. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
161. Darby v. State, 145 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. ref'd);
Blake v. State, 125 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
162. Blake, 125 S.W.3d at 724.
163. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56.
164. State v. Gonzales, 146 S.W.3d 760, 761 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2004, pet. ref'd).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 763.
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adequacy of a search warrant in Groh v. Ramirez.167 Acting on informa-
tion from a witness, Groh, an ATF agent, sought a search warrant of Ra-
mirez's home on his Montana ranch. 168 Groh's application, supported by
an affidavit, listed various weapons he believed to be located in the
house. The completed warrant form did not list any items to be seized
and did not incorporate by reference the list in the application. Although
the warrant did indicate that the magistrate was satisfied that probable
cause existed, the Court held the warrant facially invalid. 169 The fact that
the items to be seized were fully listed in the application does not cure
the problem with the warrant itself. It is the warrant that must contain
the particular items to be seized.
Although an affidavit must establish probable cause to believe certain
items probably will be found at a particular location, the police are not
limited to one location. In Price v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals
rejected the argument that law enforcement could not seek specific items
in four locations simultaneously. 170 Provided a magistrate has a substan-
tial basis in believing the items could be located in any of these locations,
an affidavit and subsequently issued warrant will withstand scrutiny.
When empowered with a search warrant, officers must operate within the
scope of the magistrate's authorization. In Long v. State, the police exe-
cuted a search warrant authorizing the search of a business establishment
named Train's. 1 71 The officers searched the Train's establishment and
also a nearby red caboose where the appellant was living. The red ca-
boose was not mentioned in the warrant or affidavit. The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals refused the argument that the authority given to the police
under the valid warrant extended to the red caboose. 172 Without men-
tioning the red caboose in the affidavit or warrant, a neutral magistrate
could not adequately review whether probable cause existed to enter ap-
pellant's home. The court concluded that the detailed description of the
business premises did not implicitly authorize the search of appellant's
home.' 73
D. CONSENT TO SEARCH
The Court of Criminal Appeals once again reminded us that a search
conducted with the consent of the suspect is a specifically established ex-
ception to the warrant requirement. But the consent must be voluntary,
which is determined from all the circumstances. The Texas and United
States Constitutions diverge on the burden of proof the state must carry
to prove the validity of the consent. The United States Constitution re-
quires the State to prove validity by a preponderance of the evidence,
167. Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004).
168. Id. at 554.
169. Id. at 558-59.
170. Price v. State, 143 S.W.3d 158, 160-61 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, pet. ref d).
171. Long v. State, 132 S.W.3d 443, 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
172. Id. at 447-48.
173. Id. at 452.
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while the Texas Constitution requires proof by clear and convincing
evidence.174
Consent is not voluntary if obtained through duress or coercion,
whether actual or implied. Texas courts have utilized six factors to deter-
mine whether the consent was voluntarily given, with no one single factor
dispositive: (1) the voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status; (2)
the presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of the
defendant's cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant's awareness of
his right to refuse consent; (5) the defendant's education and intelligence;
and (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found.175 An officer's failure to inform the suspect of the right to refuse
does not automatically render the consent involuntary; however, it is a
factor in evaluating voluntariness. Nor will the fact that the suspect is
under arrest render the consent involuntary per se. However, the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals noted that when a suspect is under arrest and is
asked to provide a breath or blood sample, the individual must be pro-
vided with the statutory warnings under Chapter 724 of the Transporta-
tion Code which include the consequences of refusing.176
In Harrison v. State, when hospital personnel could not extract a testa-
ble quantity of blood from Harrison, she consented to providing a urine
specimen. 177 But the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held Harrison's con-
sent was involuntary. The court focused on the testimony describing the
five or six unsuccessful attempts at extracting blood from Harrison's arm
and the bruising and pain resulting from each attempt. Because she was
not given her statutory warnings under the Transportation Code and con-
sent was given to avoid further painful probing, Harrison's consent was
involuntarily obtained. 178
When consent is given after a Fourth Amendment violation, a second
prong is added in addition to voluntariness: whether the consent was an
independent act of free will. Under this second prong, courts consider:
(1) the temporal proximity of the illegal conduct and the consent; (2) the
presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy
of the initial misconduct. 179
The scope of the consent under the Fourth Amendment is held to a
standard of objective reasonableness. An individual is free to limit the
scope of their consent. In the context of a traffic accident, when a patient
gives consent to provide a blood sample, the consent reasonably contem-
plates using the blood to investigate the cause of the accident or any of-
174. Rayford v. State, 125 S.W.3d 521, 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
175. Wolf v. State, 137 S.W.3d 797, 805 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet.) (citing United
States v. Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d 647, 658 (5th Cir. 2002)).
176. Ramos v. State, 124 S.W.3d 326, 332 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd).
177. Harrison v. State, 144 S.W.3d 82, 88-89 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet.
granted).
178. Id. at 89.
179. Wolf, 137 S.W.3d at 805 (citing Portillo-Aguirre, 311 F.3d at 659).
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fense connected to the accident. 180
E. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
Other Fourth Amendment issues addressed this year include:
* Knock-and-announce rule: Courts have not deviated from the Su-
preme Court's holding that police must have a reasonable suspicion
that knocking and announcing their presence would be dangerous
or futile, or that it would inhibit effective crime investigation by
allowing the destruction of evidence. 181 In United States v. Banks,
the police executed a search warrant on Banks's home, suspecting
drug sales out of the two-bedroom apartment. 182 After knocking
and announcing their presence, they executed a forcible entry after
the expiration of fifteen to twenty seconds. The Court held that
after this period elapsed, the police could fairly suspect that cocaine
would be destroyed if they waited any longer.
183
* Searches conducted by school officials: Courts continue to recog-
nize these searches need not be supported by the usual probable
cause level of suspicion, but rather reasonable suspicion1
84
* The DNA Statute-Texas Family Code section 54.0405: A blood-
draw order pursuant to the DNA statute is not an unreasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 185 The Fort
Worth Court of Appeals held that the statute is not designed to
produce evidence of a specific individual's criminal conduct. There-
fore, it falls into the "special needs" exception and is a constitu-
tional suspicionless search. The government's interest promoted by
the DNA statute outweighs the minimal physical intrusion upon a
juvenile's privacy.
* Examination of items taken as inventory: Police may continue to
examine and test items validly within their control and custody, re-
gardless of the existence of probable cause or exigent
circumstances. 186
* Plain-view doctrine: Courts routinely hold that no invasion of pri-
vacy occurs upon a seizure when (1) officers have a right to be
where they are, and (2) an item is immediately recognizable as con-
stituting evidence.1 87
180. Ramos, 124 S.W.3d at 333.
181. Bedford v. State, 131 S.W.3d 514, 517-18 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, pet. dism'd).
182. United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 33 (2003).
183. Id. at 38.
184. In re K.C.B., 141 S.W.3d 303, 305-06 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.) (applying
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)).
185. In re D.L.C., 124 S.W.3d 354, 373 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
186. Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 660-61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
187. Swarb v. State, 125 S.W.3d 672, 680 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet.
dism'd).
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III. CONCLUSION
Despite a few clarifications, a review of this past year's confession,
search, and seizure decisions illustrates no significant developments of
well-established precedents. This article exemplifies the continued uni-
formity among state and federal courts in the areas of confession,
searches, and seizures.
